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The compromiser’s dilemma: House of Lords reform
Mark Pack argues that the compromises made by Clegg and Cameron concerning House
of Lords reform have actually done a fair amount to weaken enthusiasm for an initiative that
enjoys support amongst all parties and the populace.
You propose something. Someone objects to it, giving many reasons. You of f er to make
some changes to meet some of  the objections. A deal is made and progress is
achieved. A perf ectly normal sequence of  events, both inside and outside polit ics and
whether the matter is as mundane as what to eat f or dinner tomorrow or as public as the
wording of  Parliamentary legislation.
One big risk, however, is that you of f er compromises which are too small to win over extra support yet
also too big to keep the enthusiasm of  the idea’s original supporters. The AV ref erendum is a classic of
the kind. For years many pro-electoral ref orm campaigners, in Labour, in the Liberal Democrats, in the
Electoral Ref orm Society and elsewhere, insisted that pushing f or STV was unrealistic and instead
pushed AV. STV, they said, was too idealistic; it would not get the Labour Party’s support but compromise
on AV and that support could be garnered.
When it came to it, of f ering up AV did not do much in the way of  winning support f rom Labour and others,
and did a f air amount to weaken enthusiasm f rom the keenest supporters of  electoral ref orm.
Ref orm of  the House of  Lords now presents exactly the same dilemma. It is rarely remarked on, but the
proposals put f orward by Nick Clegg and David Cameron already contain many signif icant of f ers of
compromise. The widely attacked 15 year term of  of f ice is an idea, f or example, taken f rom the 2000
Wakenham Report into Lords ref orm. A Royal Commission drawing on both Labour and Conservative
members, with a third of  its members f rom the Upper House and even a Bishop thrown in too, proposed
the 15 year idea.
Yet how has the 15 year idea been received this t ime round? Has it been welcomed by people as a good
compromise, sensibly picking up on the consensus reached by a previous cross-party group and
ref lecting the concerns of  its members f rom the Lords? Hardly.
Re-presenting this previous compromise idea has both attracted snipping f rom keen Lords ref ormers
and almost no f licker of  welcome f rom those hostile to Lords ref orm. As with the choice of  AV as the
voting system to present in a ref erendum, f ar f rom being a good compromise it has turned out to be the
worst of  all worlds.
Hence the dilemma: if  opponents so readily and acerbically reject the previous suggested compromise, is
of f ering f urther compromises really going to win them over?
That is why there is a particular appeal to the argument Guy Lodge and Michael Kenny have made to up
the ante in the arguments f or ref orm:
The case for Lords reform needs … to be rooted in an account of how power should be most
effectively and sustainably exercised in a 21st century democracy. This debate is happening
at a time when sections of the public who have become deeply disillusioned by how elites
controlling the core institutions of our economic and political systems have misused the power
entrusted to them. What links the crises that have recently engulfed the banks, parliament
and the media is that they have ultimately been triggered by concentrations of unaccountable
power.
The reforms we most need are those that begin to challenge and open up these forms of
power ‘hoarding’. Electing the House of Lords is a small, but actually quite important, and
hugely symbolic, step in this direction. Of course it is not a panacea for the problems of
irresponsible bankers and over-mighty media moguls.
But by creating a stronger, and more legitimate, second chamber, we would have a better
chance of holding the power concentrated in our ‘core executive’ to account. We might also
have a wing of the legislature that would be sufficiently powerful to stand aside from, and
question, the orthodoxies that led, for instance, to light-touch regulation of our banks and the
mountain of household indebtedness that fuelled the political economy of the previous era.
It is an appealing argument, even if  one not without drawbacks. In particular, an attack on the
unaccountable hoarding of  power will sound to many Lords like an attack on themselves. Even some
(anti- ref orm) Liberal Democrat peers have taken to complain in public about how much they dislike
ref ormers crit icising them.
The big risk is that such attacks theref ore drive away some who might otherwise be won over to ref orm
and that it makes the passage of  legislation through Parliament harder, rather than easier. However,
sometimes taking a risk is what it takes to succeed.
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